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~But What Exactly Does the Directive 
Say?': The Role of EU Acquis Experts in 
Industrial Relations l 
Godfrey Baldacchino 
Introduction 
In autumn 2000, a team of 'three wise men' was engaged by the 
European Commission to examine the human rights record of 
Austria's political establishment, and particularly the behaviour 
of its ruling coalition. It was then clear that a neat solution had 
been found to end Austria's political isolation in Western Europe, 
stop the increasing resentment against the EU among Austrian 
citizens, and thus save the EU from further embarrassment. 
Irrespective of the details of a much publicized case, this was yet 
another example of the often unclear dynamics between expertise 
and political incumbents in crafting policy at a European level. 
On this particular occasion, experts had been deployed to legitimise 
a U-turn in political strategy. Thus the experts, in less than 1000 
words, provided the objective and independent assessment to 
corroborate and recommend a particular course of political action, 
which (not coincidentally) was exactly the one being, not quite 
silently, contemplated. 
I The argttments of this paper were first presented at an Indl/strial Relations SlIllImer School held 
at the University ofRethYlllllo, Crete, Greece ill 2000, alld subsequently pttblished ill the European 
J ollrnal of Indmtrial Relations, Vol. 7, No.2, pp. 13 7 -152. My thallks to Andreas ivfoschonas. 
Socrates KOlliordos, Simon Bmllttil, Richard Hyman, Alfred Mallia Milanes, Saviour Rizzo, 
Nerissa S"ltcl1la and anonYlllol/S EJIR referees for their critical comments. 
191 
192 Evolving Industrial Relations in Malta 
This Article 
This article explores a similar tension between experts and political 
actors in relation to the sphere of industrial relations. The 
contention is that responsibilities and agendas related to EU affairs, 
particularl y the social policy obligations arising from ED 
membership, are leading to an ascendancy of the unaccountable 
and 'scientific' expert in European industrial relations, certainly 
at a national level. It becomes, therefore, increasingly naive to 
support a classical model of nationally based industrial relations, 
which presupposes the social partners as the key actors. Having 
the characteristics of a supranational and transnational European 
class, EU experts may be influencing the tenet and substance of 
industrial relations much more than we may care to admit. 
This article first documents the manner in which a specific group 
or class of experts assumes authority and legitimacy in dealing 
with EU matters. It next seeks to describe how such a group or 
class of individuals gets to influence the tenor, nature and dynamics 
of industrial relations on a national basis, and with what effects. 
Lastly, it reviews the impact of such 'third-party experts' on 
European industrial relations generally. 
EU Newspeak 
Directives, acquis, avis, recommendations, regulations, derogations, 
transitional periods, communications, Commission, Council, 
Parliament, qualified majority, Treaty, Maastricht, Brussels, 
Amsterdam and so on: this is a sample from the large collection of 
terms which easily boggles the mind of the novice to European 
Union (EU) matters, but which must become staple fare to anyone 
venturing to develop some understanding of how the EU works. 
The large mass ofliterature, case law and other material concerning 
the EU is nothing short of awesome. The acquis communautaire is 
claimed to be some 80,000 pages long, and growing every day. 
There are now a record 13 applicant states which are having to 
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integrate this corpus of regulation and practice into national 
legislation in the process leading to eventual EU accession. 'Social 
Policy and Employment' is the title of the thirteenth chapter out 
of the set of 31 which comprise the EU acqttis; its contents are of 
direct concern to the self-employed, waged or salaried workers, 
employers and their representatives. 
Inspiration 
I am indebted for the inspiration for this article to my status as an 
'expert' on Eutopean social policy in my own small sovereign state, 
Malta. Ever since the re-elected Nationalist Government 
reactivated Malta's bid for EU membership in autumn 1998, the 
country has found itself on a roller-coaster of meetings, deadlines, 
implementations, legal drafting, administrative reform, impact 
assessments and so on, all associated with Malta's self-appointed 
obligation to conform to the EU acqttis by a deadline of 1 January 
2003. Meanwhile, most local social, political and economic players 
are engaged in an intensive media campaign to shift the electorate 
either for or against membership, in the run-up to a keenly 
anticipated referendum on EU accession. Malta thus presents itself 
as the smallest country among the set of 13 'first wave plus second 
wave' applicants, the one with the strongest official opposition to 
EU membership among all applicant states2 , as well as one trying 
to undergo the transition to qualify for membership in a fairly 
short time3 . 
2 "The only country withour a large majority [in favour of EU membership] is Malta, 
where only 53% of eligible respondents indicate that they would have voted in favour of 
EU membership" - Applicant COllntries Ettrobarollleter 2001, p.3. Consult: http:// 
europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/cceb_en.htm 
J Malta drew up an association agreement with the then EC in 1970 and applied for EU 
membership in 1990. This application was frozen during the period of the last Labour 
Government (1996-1998). Malta's EU membership bid became officially reactivated in 
December 1998. Screening started in Spring 1999 and formal negotiations commenced 
in February 2000. 
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A Personal Note 
As a university-based sociologist working in the sphere of labour 
relations education and research, I had taken an obvious interest 
in EU social policy over the years, and had organized a variety of 
educational visits for Maltese trade union leaders in connection 
with the EU4 . My monthly contributions to a local newspaper, 
focusing largely on labour relations issues, increasingly considered 
EU developments. In spring 1999, I was genuinely surprised to 
be invited to sit as one of six national 'expert core members' of the 
Malta-EU Steering and Action Committee (MEUSAC), the 
institution responsible for preparing Malta's negotiating positions 
with respect to the European Commission and enjoying wide public 
representation, though with one glaring exception5 • In this 
capacity, I have also participated as a member of the Maltese 
government delegation to a couple of acquis screening sessions in 
Brussels. I have been asked to prepare reports for both major trade 
union organizations on the implications of adopting Chapter 13 
of the acquis in Malta, and participated in various popular and 
academic fora (at the university, road shows, on radio and on 
television) to expound on such matters. 
In autumn 1999, I was invited by the Malta Employers' 
Association (MEA) to carry out a study comparing the ED's social 
policy, labour law and industrial relations acquis with that in force 
in Malta, identifying the differences and recommending action. I 
accepted the assignment in a personal capacity, also because this 
was the first time that the MEA had approached me for any such 
commission; as a person associated with trade unions and with 
declared labour sympathies, a distancing from and by the MEA 
4 These included familiarization visits for Maltese trade IInionists to BrltSsels coordinated by the 
European COlllmission and all exchange with Cypriot trade unionists. The latter was published as 
Symeonides & Baldacchino (1996). 
j The Malta Labour Party was invited to send a representative to MEUSAC, bllt refused. 
Nevertheless, both core grollp and interest grollp members 011 MEUSAC c01/le with different political 
perSllasiollS. 
But What Exactly Does the Directive Say? 195 
was to be expected. Yet, it seems that my EtJ 'expertise' (and 
perhaps the unavailability of any decent local alternative) was 
enough to oblige the MEA to override its apprehensions in my 
regard and to place its trust in my competences. 
My report was fully endorsed by the MEA - to the extent that it 
was published without any changes from the original manuscript 
(Baldacchino, 2000). The report then became the official MEA 
position paper for making representations to the Malta government 
as to where Maltese employers stand with respect to the 'social 
policy' implications of eventual ED membership. 
I deliberately concluded my study with a national sample survey 
of employer perceptions, and therefore what I was proposing was 
couched as a natural consequence of fieldwork whose validity and 
merits could hardly be contested. I was, nevertheless, quite 
overwhelmed by the reactions of the MEA leadership in 'coming 
round' to the recommendations I had tabled. It was this very 
personal, ongoing experience, which obliged me to consider the 
role of 'ED experts' in crafting national industrial relations and 
social policy. This article is, therefore, autobiographical in many 
instances and relies considerably on such 'primary data'. 
The Industrial Relations Setting 
There seems to be a fair degree of consensus on the fact that 
industrial relations concerns the exercise of job regulation and the 
assertion of some kind of secutity, stability and predictability at 
the workplace, for the mutual benefit of employers, management, 
employees as well as 'third party' stakeholders such as consumers 
and governments. A focus on such a state of, albeit continually 
reconstituted, 'order' (for example, Strauss et al., 1971, p. 104) or 
'governance' (Streeck, 1998, p. 15) may, however, jaundice any 
assessment of departures from such a virtuous state - such as any 
struggles on the nat ute and extent of labour control (Hyman, 1975, 
p. 26) - as dysfunctional, anomalous or infectious. A micro-based 
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analysis which focuses on the behavioural and political strategies 
and counter-strategies of labour and management has become a 
specific strand of industrial relations research in recent decades, 
this being in part a healthy reaction to the stultifying functionalism 
of order-obsessed approaches. Meanwhile, the ambit of the study 
of job regulation has expanded to take on board comparative, 
transnational and European processes, apart from more specifically 
sectoral, national or regional developments. 
What is often forgotten in this scholarly literature is that the 
key players of industrial relations are not just the social partners 
and their representatives. The industrial relations systems paradigm 
established by Dunlop (1958), an almost pure example of the bias 
of modernity, remains particularly solid. It has only been somewhat 
challenged lately by pleas to incorporate socially marginal groups, 
such as women and homosexuals (Dabscheck, 1995; Piore, 1995), 
as well as 'end-users', such as customers (Bellemare, 2000). Yet, 
often lurking in the shadow of the theory, there exists a motley 
entourage of "free-floating intellectuals" (Dahrendorf, 1964, p. 225, 
after Weber) to whom industrial relations is also their business, 
though in a markedly different sense. Indeed, the actual regulation 
of work may be significantly determined by authoritative personnel 
who may have no direct stake in the outcome of their counsel. Far 
removed from the 'contested terrain' of the workplace, key decisions 
and positions may be taken in the offices of consultancy firms, in 
the corridors oflaw COutts, or in the academic offices of universities. 
Such "outsiders" (Perlman, 1928), members of the intelligentsia, 
"have the capacity to speak (uneasily) for others" (Frow, 1995, p. 164). 
In such deliberations, whether enterprise (micro-) based or nation 
(macro-) oriented, an analysis of the role of 'experts' has been 
surprisingly, and I would add uncomfortably, absent. There is 
definitely room for unease here, and it is the intention of this article 
to start to 'unpack' the reasons for such discomfort. On the agenda, 
therefore, and in agreement with Bellemare (2000, p. 384-5) is 
the problematisation of the notion of the 'actor' in industrial relations. 
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Defining the Experts 
By 'experts' I mean individuals who are not directly involved in 
industrial relations (they are not representatives of labour, nor of 
capital, often not even of the state), but who, nevertheless, playa 
very important role in suggesting, even determining, the actual 
unfolding of industrial relations between any combination of these 
three groups. They obtain and use their influence by virtue of the 
combination of knowledge , skill qualification, experience and track 
record in industrial relations and related areas: a portfolio which 
renders them and their advice naturally acceptable to one or more 
of the social partners. Like the older professions (archetypically, 
medicine, law and theology), and like the new middle class to 
which they typically belong, the market capacity of most of these 
experts is almost totally dependent on claims to 'esoteric 
knowledge', alias technical or intellectual expertise (Milner, 1999, 
p. 157). Such individuals can wield disproportionate power: they 
are not generally accountable to a constituency and are, therefore, 
not obliged to expose themselves to public or membership sctutiny; 
their expertise can provide them with a special legitimacy and a 
positional advantage in any argument in which they are deemed 
to be versed; they can, and do, with tact and diplomacy, exert a 
significant influence on policy and decision-making. Much like 
dei ex machina, their exclusion from industrial relations sctutiny 
and analysis may only help to augment their power and almost to 
mystify their role. The outcome of bargaining rounds, the handling 
of an impasse, the interpretation of an award ... so much can depend 
on such 'significant others'. Conversely put, the leverage and 
bargaining power of a social partner may depend considerably on 
the wisdom and shrewdness of its team of experts. The trade union 
leader, the general manager, the labour director, these may be 
merely the front line of a human resource machinery which is 
obliged to depend much more on its concealed professional cadres 
than one would care to admit. Such an uneasy dependence is likely 
to increase with an expanding corpus of knowledge, laws, 
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regulations, case law, administrative procedures and other 
provisions governing industrial relations. A potentially disabling 
process of professionalisation (Illich, 1977)? 
Who are these individuals? They include: (a) lawyers versed in 
labour law, who habitually defend their clients or press their case 
in court, tribunal or labour commission hearings and sittings, all 
the more so in cultures and environments which thrive on 
litigation; (b) partners in accountancy firms, industrial relations 
and human resources consultants who advise clients on strategic 
and tactical issues; (c) influential and charismatic labour officials 
from state departments, state ministers and other seasoned 
arbitrators, conciliators and mediators who develop a working 
relationship with the social partners; (d) industrial relations 
academics and scholars who may actively involve themselves, or 
else be called upon to support the planning and policy-setting 
mechanisms of one or more of the same social partners; and (e) 
researchers and enterprising individuals who may have a 
specialization in a particularly relevant field of study. Of course, 
such identities may overlap or come together in one and the same 
person. 
This approach to industrial relations processes draws obvious 
parallelisms with elitist political theory. There is the same toning 
down of the discretion often assumed to lie at the hands of elected 
political actors and their fora; there is a sinister recognition that 
certain groups, or classes, of actors have an ingrained endurance 
and a position of power from which they are not likely to be easily 
dislodged, even in the wake of the 'changing of the guard' normal 
of democratic politics; there is a fatalistic understanding that such 
resilient actors have the ability to distort and shape both agendas 
and outcomes, in order to preserve and advance their own distinct 
interests. Unlike Plato's guardians, Veblen's technocrats and 
Mannheim's intellectuals, such EU experts may be gifted, but are 
not necessarily selfless people. As market players, experts have a 
material interest in the virtues of scarcity; as opinion formers, they 
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may have a prowess in manipulation (Lasswell, 1911). 
The Evolution of Experts 
Experts have been defined as depositories of "effortfully acquired 
abilities" (Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1993, p. 3). They tend to come 
and go, accompanying waves of specialization and discovery, and 
they tend to disappear (not without some last-ditch, desperate, 
rearguard action) into the background when their competencies 
become popularised and deprofessionalised or otherwise lose their 
relevance and glamour. Experts exercise market power and political 
influence in inverse ratio to the number of their cadre and in direct 
proportion to the novelty, scope and duration of the demand for 
their 'core competence' from the wider society6. They may exercise 
deliberate closure tactics to restrict access to that intellectual capital 
which is the source of their privilege (Murphy, 1986). 
The EU has its own impressive discourse and thus requires its 
own compendium of literacy and operacy skills. Laffan (1997, p. 
12) refers to such a discourse as part of the symbolism necessary to 
create that 'imagined community' which is the invention of 
'Europe'. This unique, transnational mechanism imposes a powerful 
obligation for an understanding of its internal workings on its 
member states and (at least some of) their citizens: first, in order 
to conform to legal parameters and minimum standards; second, 
in order to tap EU resources and funds; third, in order to harmonize 
administrative practices and procedures; fourth, in order to 
participate fully and proactively in the EU's various decision-
making structures and thus have a say in determining policy. 
(, Accoltllfants and auditors, for example, have become i1JStitllfiollalized experts in the wake of the 
regulation and standardization of cOlllpany discloSltre practices - a respolISibility all too glaring in 
the wake of the Enron case. Computer programmers. software developers and illfernet eIIgineers are 
among the recent wave of experts to C/lltivate a leverage on the world of work and organizatiollal 
development; they fill gaps most companies have in compllter literacy and operacy. now become quite 
essential tools for doing bminess. 
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The EU has many of the characteristics of a 'mock bureaucracy' 
(Blau, 1968). It functions through highly complex procedures, 
which are not only public and official, but also implicit and 
undeclared. It is also clear that an effective relationship with the 
sophisticated mechanisms of EU governance (both in terms of 
meeting obligations, and perhaps more importantly in terms of 
tapping its vast resources) depends on a familiarity with the 
unwritten rules of the game, or at least an ability to 'learn the 
ropes': how to develop networks and cultivate relationships which 
may potentially and eventually deliver. 
A Heavy Burden 
While citizens at large may profess ignorance and confess 
bewilderment at the panoply ofEU-related and EU-dictated detail, 
practically all collective groupings, such as civil servants, farmers, 
environmentalists, industrialists, traders, customs officers, 
academics, trade unions, and professional associations, should (or 
must?) at least come to terms with the variety of ways in which 
the specific corpus of EU legislation and practice will have an 
impact on their behaviour. It is clearly in their interest to do so. 
Furthermore, it is also in their interest to have effective lobbying 
mechanisms infiltrating the corridors of Brussels and Strasbourg, 
finding out what is going on, reacting quickly to events, 
establishing a sympathetic ear in a strategic location and so on. 
Similar obligations now loom for 12 applicant states (the six 
'first wave' Luxembourg summit applicants (1997) and the six 
'second wave' Helsinki applicants (1999), but excluding Turkey) 
once they have proceeded with their negotiations with the European 
Commission. What is, however, different from previous 
enlargement exercises is that, while applicant states are (generally 
speaking) the least prepared to take the acqllis on board (certainly 
by comparison with the last enlargement of 1995), they are, 
nevertheless, technically expected to conform to an acquis which 
But What Exactly Does the Directive Say? 201 
continues to grow ever more awesome. 
Naturally, existing EU Member States have the benefit of advance 
warning and foresight of any new obligations by virtue of their 
involvement in the (usually lengthy) process, which leads eventually 
to the introduction of the obligation itself. Applicant states, in 
stark contrast, are by definition presented with a/ait accompli. This 
does not only mean that the tempo of compliance must be faster; 
it also means that the generation of local expertise to implement 
any EU-dictated measures and to come to terms with how to 
'manage' the behemoth (in the dual sense described above) must 
also be faster. The European Commission itself expresses concern, 
at least on an official level, at the probable vacuum of understanding 
and competence by questioning what it calls the 'administrative 
capacity' and level of preparedness of applicant states to conform 
to their eventual obligations in accordance with the given acqttis. 
This creates the scenario which will naturally and quickly spawn 
'experts', be these real 'heavyweights' or incompetent 'pseuds'. 
While expertise may be easiest to identify "when it differs most 
dramatically from what ordinary people can do" (Bereiter & 
Scardamalia, 1993, p. 6), less striking differences may have a 
surprisingly similar effect. At first, anyone with the least advantage 
may be sought after for information and advice: even those who 
may have visited Brussels on holiday may find themselves suddenly 
respected for the insights on the EU which may have presumably 
emerged from such a 'rare' experience, and these same individuals 
may recognize that lucrative spin-offs may be forthcoming if they 
assiduously and intentionally cultivate such a standing. If, as the 
proverb goes, in the land of the blind, the one-eyed is sovereign, 
then, frankly, there may be no one around to call one's bluff and it 
is relatively easy for any modest or incidental insight to be promoted 
as, or be mistaken for, proper expertise. Such is also more likely to 
happen in the least populated states, as well as those where the 
standard of education is low (Baldacchino, 1997, pp. 73-6). There 
is bound to be a rush (by business, pressure groups, government 
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and media) to recruit and tap the limited resources available with 
some modicum of European specialism; and another rush of 
individuals who will strategically embark on education, training, 
in-service programmes or placements with some EU relevance to 
position themselves within the new category of sought-after experts. 
Such experts may also become quite adept at tapping funding as 
well as the certification of their expertise through regular research 
contracts and invitations from the European Commission itself 
and associated foundations. Once recognized by the Commission, 
they are even more likely to be recognized, and feted with awe and 
respect, in their own country. Do we not espy here the patterns of 
a virruous cycle? 
There are various stages of progress towards expertise that one 
may wish to identify, while keeping in mind that not every person 
will, or will be allowed to, or will want to, succeed in making a 
full transition. The point of departure is usually a situation of 
unconscious incompetence: where the constituency does not even 
realise that it lacks a certain expertise. The next stage is that of 
conscious incompetence: in crude terms, a realization of ignorance, 
a condition which has rapidly come upon the citizens, policy-
makers, civil servants, business and community leaders in the latest 
dozen EU applicant states, many of which are still coming to terms 
with the radical effects of their recent transition to a market 
economy and a pluralist democracy. The third stage is that of 
conscious competence, where those who have mastered the expertise 
go about practising and brandishing it in a self-conscious manner. 
The fourth and final stage is arguably that of unconscious 
competence, where the experts have now mastered their craft and 
skill so well that they 'perform' naturally, without any need for 
deliberate planning and problem-solving (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 
1986). What then is the impact of such experts on the unfolding 
of industrial relations in their home territory, if any? 
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The Thrust of Trust 
Experts, like true professionals, require considerable autonomy to 
exercise their skill, even when required to do so in an employment 
relationship. Experts behave in a manner that assumes and assutes 
that they are recognized as responsible for how they work, often 
even why they work, since they command discretion certainly on 
methodology and often on action agendas. The resultant 'service 
relationship' goes beyond the cash nexus and is thus invested with 
a considerable measute of 'trust' (Goldthorpe, 1982, pp. 162,170). 
Such a trust relationship, however, differs from the one described 
by Fox (1974) in labout-management relations. We are here 
referring to a privileged standing which also means that, typically, 
the contractor tends to go along with what the expert advises; 
indeed, it is at the point of choosing the expert in the first place (if 
and when such a choice is at all available) that the contractor 
exercises maximum leverage over the eventual service. A very 
charged, personalized choice tends to be made, the contractor 
knowing fully well that, once the choice is made, she or he has 
almost a moral obligation to accept, substantively and conceptually, 
whatever the 'expert' will then advise. After all, expertise is a most 
idiosyncratic market good: the value of an expert's advice is not so 
easily proved or disproved. The political weight of such advice, 
the extent to which any such expert advice will be propelled 
reverently, swiftly and without adulteration into policy formulation 
by the contracting party, will depend largely on the 'knowledge 
gap' between the contractor and the expert. 
Of coutse, there are various possible permutations here: the 
contractors may think that they are knowledgeable, when in reality 
they are not; or the contractors may really be quite knowledgeable, 
introducing experts only to professionalise and graft some extra 
credibility and legitimacy to an (already adopted?) position; or 
again, the contractors may have some idea of what the subject 
matter is about, but they have come upon such knowledge 
incidentally or haphazardly through secondary SOutces. In this latter 
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case, the contractors cannot afford the time to delve deeply into 
the subject, and would perhaps be willing to accept, not without 
chagrin, that a little knowledge is a dangerous thing. They are, 
therefore, bound to find themselves in a welcoming and agreeable 
disposition to their experts' recommendations, particularly if, as 
good experts habitually do, the latter bolster any proposals and 
recommendations with considerable supporting evidence and 
arguments. 
Experts, from their point of view, also know that their contractors 
must eventually 'own' any recommendations which they put 
forward. Such ownership can take place in different ways: this is 
ideally an exercise in conviction. However, albeit rarely admitted, 
this may boil down simply to a question of trust and blind faith. 
The dynamics of such a critical transmission remain glaringly aloof 
from scrutiny: the manner in which experts, who "enjoy 
considerable authority" (Bachrach, 1967, p. 78), manage the 
translation of their technical competence into unaccountable, 
political power. Where such a transmission is successful, the 
contractor can be relied upon to prove an ardent espouser and 
ambassador of the expert's recommendations. 
Induced Policy Shifts 
Ardent enough to soften, perhaps even dislodge, hardened 
positions? Ardent enough to cause a substantial, even radical, policy 
shift in the attitude of the social partner in question? 
Of all the EUs acquis, perhaps Chapter 13 is exceptional precisely 
in its manner of relinquishing overall responsibility for the 
substance of many obligations, by devolving such to agreements 
struck between the representatives of employers and workers. A 
typical clause in a Chapter 13 directive leaves ample room for the 
social partners "to conclude ... agreements [at both national and 
European levels} adapting and/or complementing the provisions 
of this agreement in a manner which will take account of the specific 
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needs of the social partners concerned" [Clause 6(3), Directive 97/ 
81}. 
This fairly generous provision (known as the Kristoffersen clause) 
falls squarely within the spirit of subsidiarity promulgated by the 
EU, but it is also a consequence of other factors. It takes cognisance 
of the very diverse industrial relations frameworks, cultures and 
traditions in the different Member States; it captures the hesitation 
of various Member States towards allowing Brussels and its 
bureaucracy to intervene and force some standardization over an 
area which has to date largely escaped being considered "of 
European concern"8 , except at the level of pious principles9 • Bur, 
perhaps, most significantly, it reflects the status of the Agreement 
on Social Policy (an annexe to the Treaty of Maastricht, but an 
integral part of the Treaty of Amsterdam) that establishes a 
procedure for reaching European-level contractual agreements by 
the social partners which can take the place of legislation. The 
emergent 'framework agreements'lO are a manifestation of an upheld 
legitimacy for representatives of employers and labour in securing 
European-level deals. A similar legitimacy is recognized at national 
level. 
My recommendations to the MEA have emphasized the 
opportunities for such bilateral negotiation, and the advantages of 
securing such deals to both trade unions and employer 
organizations. Indeed, my report concludes with an appeal for such 
'social partnership'. Now, bilateralism is not a preferred standpoint 
in Maltese labour relations where nationwide issues are concerned: 
8 Only the 1997 Luxembol/rg slltll111it formalized a El/ropean emploYlllelit strategy. Specific laboltr 
relations features (fixing wages & salaries, the right of association, the right to strike and the right 
to impose lockollts) are assidllollsly defended as exclmive responsibilities of Member States. 
9 The main initiatives here are the European Social Charter (approved by 11 EU member states in 
1989, and in turn based on a 1961 COl/ncil of Ell rope doclt111ent) and the framework directives 011 
oCCllpational health and safety. 
10 To date, these include those on parelltalleave (December 1996), part-time workers Utme 1997) 
and workers on fixed term definite colltracts Uamtary 1999). 
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civil society remains weak, and a political system dominated by 
visible personal contacts and exchange sees politicians regularly 
involving themselves in labour relations disputes, with the other 
social actors regularly soliciting their intervention, and thus often 
shifting the onus for any change and reform onto the political 
elite. Yet there are some clear signals that the MEA will be 
proceeding to explore the national-level bipartism option seriously, 
and certainly in a specific number of areas. 
Concluding Reflections 
As a self-made and market-recognized expert on EU affairs, I have 
found myself among the ranks of a growing expert class in Malta, 
as in other EU applicant and EU Member States. Many such experts 
have developed close links with Brussels, and their involvement 
in this area of knowledge is likely to have been predicated on a 
certain sympathy with the European project; otherwise, their 
attitude towards the EU and its workings may have mellowed 
with their increasing (lucrative?) involvement in EU-related affairs, 
and their exchanges with like-minded experts from Europe. I am 
suggesting so because it seems to me that EU experts also tend to 
be largely pro-EU and, therefore, working, at least in the various 
applicant states, primarily in favour of their country assuming EU 
membership status and persevering on the road to European 
integration. Any movement by Maltese trade unions and employers 
towards 'social partnership' would be in effect a move towards 
convergence with the continental European social model: "strong 
trade unions, wide coverage of collective bargaining, an emphasis 
on employee rights, tripartite regulation and some form ... of 
representation of employees at company level" (Gill & Krieger, 
2000, pp. 111-12). Are, therefore, 'EU experts' a hitherto 
unrecognised, homogenizing force in European labour relations? 
Has the MEA accepted my counsel? Perhaps. But perhaps not. I 
may be simply deluding myself. I may have merely provided an 
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objective crutch to support an emerging policy standpoint of a 
specific faction of the MEA leadership. The declared impetus for 
change may quickly subside and fall victim to other, urgent 
considerations. Time will tell. In the meantime, I may hazard to 
identify the following tentative reflections. 
Is there a new European industrial relations at the dawn of the 
third Christian millennium? While national labour relations 
systems in Europe continue to demonstrate unabashed diversity 
(Ferner & Hyman, 1992), there are clear hints towards a 
convergence of coordination at a trans-European level. The inroads 
on European social policy in the wake of the Delors Presidency of 
the ED Commission, the procedures of the European Employment 
Strategy, the dominance of left-of-centre governments in most of 
the ED Member States during the 1990s, along with the accession 
of three corporatist states in 1995, are all likely to have contributed 
to this homogenizing process (Goetschy, 1999). A new 'logic of 
labourism' (pace Kerr et aI., 1962) has been sanctioned and 
legitimised by a core set of ED directives. One directive in 
particular, that setting up European Works Councils, facilitates 
the transnational exchange and comparison of conditions of 
employment in large transnational firms. The euro will further 
contribure to such benchmarking, now that it is legal tender since 
January 2002. 'European Industrial Relations' is coming into its 
own as a specific domain for research (Marginson, 2000). 
The growth and consolidation of a trans-European cadre of ED 
experts can be regarded as both an effect and a contributor to any 
such convergence. Such experts may be advocating the merits of, 
and facilitating the transition or consolidation towards, a revamped 
form of social corporatism, which has today become, willy-nilly, 
continental Europe's industrial relations benchmark. 
Does a technical elite get increasingly to influence the political 
elite, particularly in an age dominated by a knowledge-driven 
economy? Is the ED itself a knowledge-driven polity and 
bureaucracy? If so, is a competence in ED Newspeak (Orwell, 1948) 
208 Evolving Industrial Relations in Malta 
not simply a necessary condition for effective EU membership, 
but possibly also a ploy to facilitate European integration? Are 
EU experts serving as the agents of another form of 'democratic 
deficit' in the guise of a standardizing Europeanisation, that form 
of institution building which is perhaps the single most important 
difference between the EU and other regionalisms such as NAFTA 
or APEC (Sweet Stone & Sandholtz, 1997)? And, if so, are such 
experts going about this mission deliberately or inadvertently? 
In any case, a critical appraisal of the implications of such 
'philosopher kings' (a possible characterization of politically 
influential intellectual capital) on avowedly democratic institutions 
(such as trade unions) and on the democratic process generally 
appears timely. IfEU public policy is embedded in and animated 
by a politics of expertise, the exposure and analysis of such 'nested 
games' should further fuel the debate on issues of democracy, 
legitimacy, citizenship and accountability, so central to the EU 
project today (Marks et ai., 1996). 
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